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Electric Vehicles and Time-of-Use Rates:  
The Impending Role of the New York State 





I. THE FIGHT AGAINST FUEL INFLEXIBILITY 
The United States has a transportation problem.  With over 
250 million registered vehicles1 demanding more than seventy 
percent of the country’s total oil supply,2 the U.S. transportation 
sector3
 
* Jake Seligman is a Learned and Augustus Hand Fellow at Pace 
University School of Law and a Climate and Energy Fellow at the Yale School of 
Forestry & Environmental Studies where he is pursuing a Master of 
Environmental Management degree.  He received his B.S. from Cornell 
University and focuses his work on energy law and project finance.  He would 
like to thank James Van Nostrand, Executive Director of the Pace Energy and 
Climate Center, for his generous support throughout the research and writing 
process. 
 sits precariously at the center of both environmental and 
national security issues.  The sector’s overwhelming reliance on 
 1. Table 1-11: Number of U.S. Aircraft, Vehicles, Vessels, and Other 
Conveyances, U.S. DEP’T. OF TRANSP., RESEARCH AND INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., 
BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, http://www.bts.gov/publications/ 
national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_11.html (last visited Oct. 25, 
2010). 
 2. Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=oil_home# tab2 (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2010) (the transportation sector consumes 8,997,000 barrels/day 
(378 million gallons/day)). 
 3. The transportation sector is comprised of vehicles that move goods or 
people, including boats, aircraft, and rail.  This article focuses on automobiles 
and light trucks, which account for sixty percent of the transportation sector’s 
energy demand. See Use of Energy in the United States Explained, Energy Use 
for Transportation, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=us_energy_transportati
on (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
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oil presents the most difficult challenge to achieving the twin 
aims of energy independence and significantly reduced 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, not because it is the largest 
energy-consuming sector (it is not)4 or because its combustion 
process produces more GHG emissions than electricity 
generators’ combustion (it does not),5
 Unlike electricity generation that can, and increasingly 
does, come from cleaner domestic options like natural gas, solar, 
wind, geothermal, and nuclear, the transportation sector is built 
around the combustion engine, which requires an almost-
unwavering commitment to oil.  Potential alternatives to oil such 
as ethanol and biodiesel have yet to conclusively prove their 
worth on an environmental or economic basis.
 but because of its inherent 
inflexibility. 
6  Hydrogen has 
continued to remain just beyond the range of feasible fuel 
alternatives, and investors have made little effort to jumpstart 
the infrastructure overhaul its widespread use would require.7
 Within the next four years, nearly every major car company 
will have a grid-enabled vehicle (GEV)
  
However, the transportation sector is by no means stuck with oil.  
Indeed, the automobile industry has already developed a viable 
alternative: electric vehicles. 
8 on the market.9
 
 4. See Use of Energy in the United States Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=us_ energy_use 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (the transportation sector consumes 29% of total 
energy in the U.S. whereas the industrial sector consumes 30%, the commercial 
sector consumes 19%, and the residential sector consumes 22%). 
  While 
 5. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2008 3-6 (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads10/US-GHG-Inventory-
2010_Report.pdf (in 2008, total GHG emissions from electricity generation were 
2374.3 Tg CO2 Eq. and total GHG emissions from transportation were 1813.4 Tg 
CO2 Eq). 
 6. See The Future of Biofuels: The Post-Alcohol World, ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 
2010, at 84. 
 7. For a discussion of the failures of hydrogen-fueled vehicles, see Hydrogen 
Tries Again, ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2010, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/15981031. 
 8. “Grid-enabled vehicle” is a term that includes both electric vehicles, 
which have only an electric motor, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, which 
can run on gasoline and battery like current full hybrids, but can recharge from 
an outlet, which greatly increases fuel economy. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/4
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diffusion of GEVs in the marketplace is in its nascent stages, 
their potential market penetration could be great, given the 
comparable costs to current combustion vehicles, high oil prices, 
and the increasing awareness of the environmental issues and 
costs associated with burning fossil fuels.  In March 2009, 
President Obama set aside over two billion dollars in competitive 
grants for electric vehicle manufacturers in furtherance of his 
goal of having one million plug-in hybrid electric vehicles 
(PHEVs) on the road by 2015.10
 By shifting the source of energy from oil combustion to 
electricity generation, widespread GEV use would combat the 
transportation sector’s fuel-inflexibility problem.  The energy 
supply of vehicles that rely on the grid for their power is coupled 
to the electric grid’s energy supply, and no longer tied to one fuel.  
Although much of the country’s electricity transmission and 
distribution grid is fueled primarily by coal combustion
 
11, the grid 
(unlike current cars) has options.  Not only can policies like 
carbon regulation and renewable portfolio standards, which 
mandate renewable energy inclusion in state energy portfolios, 
help renewable energy increase its role in the electricity supply 
mix, but converting coal plants into cleaner-burning natural gas 
facilities makes increasing business sense as the costs of pollution 
increase and the price of natural gas decreases.  Additionally, 
many electric utilities offer clean energy options, whereby a 
customer can elect to purchase electrons (or at least credits for 
those electrons) from renewable sources.12
 
 9. See John Halliwell, Plug-in Vehicles: A New Way of Thinking about the 
Electric Grid, Presentation at the New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority’s Environmental Monitoring, Evaluation and Protection 
Conference, (Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://www.nyserda.org/ 
programs/Environment/EMEP/conference_2009/presentations/Halliwell_John_P
lug-In%20Vehicles%20A%20New%20Way%20of%20Thinking%20about% 
20the%20Electric%20Grid.pdf (slides from presentation available at this link). 
  In other words, GEV 
 10. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Remarks of President Barack 
Obama at Southern California Edison Electric Vehicle Technical Center (Mar. 
19, 2009), available at http://www.energy.gov/7067.htm. 
 11. See Net Generation by Energy Source: Total (All Sectors), U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/table1_1.html (last 
visited, Nov. 10, 2010). 
 12. See, e.g., ConEd Solutions NYC, CMTY. ENERGY, 
http://www.communityenergyinc.com/NYC (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
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penetration would give drivers access to a wide array of cleaner, 
more sustainable, domestic fuels. 
Increasing reliance on electricity generation for 
transportation fuel is not without its challenges.  For widespread 
GEV adoption to be successful, battery-charging infrastructure 
must also be widespread, with an emphasis on in-home charging 
stations and, to a lesser extent, workplace and publicly accessible 
charging stations.  While the infrastructure implications are 
exciting, it remains unclear how an electrification ecosystem will 
actually look.  What is clear is that GEVs will add stress to the 
electric grid, as car owners will demand more electricity. 
The size of GEVs’ impact on the grid varies along with 
market share predictions.  According to the Department of 
Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), GEVs will 
have a twenty-five percent share of the automobile market by 
2020.13  ORNL projects that, by 2030, New York14 alone will have 
2.42 million GEVs on the road.15  The Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI) used twenty percent by 2050 market share as a 
low estimate, employed a medium market share of sixty-two 
percent by 2050 and a high market share of eighty percent by 
2050 in its study of the environmental benefits of GEVs.16
As Chart 1 shows, depending on the electricity fuel source, 
2010 GHG emission levels could fall by anywhere from twenty-
eight percent to sixty-seven percent per vehicle when a GEV is 
  
Regardless of which market penetration is most likely, the 
immediate environmental benefits of this shift away from oil 
combustion are significant (although largely beyond the scope of 
this article). 
 
 13. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF 
PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES ON REGIONAL POWER GENERATION 6 (2008), 
available at www.ornl.gov/info/ornlreview/v41_1_08/regional_phev_ analysis.pdf 
[hereinafter POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES]. 
 14. This article will continue to focus on New York as an example as it is a 
state that faces many of the challenges that GEV’s pose to the electric grid and 
regulators. 
 15. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES, supra note 13, 
at 6. 
 16. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST. & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES 4-6 (2007), 
available at mydocs.epri.com/docs/public/000000000001015325.pdf. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/4
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substituted for a conventional vehicle.17  The GHG reductions 
increase over time and, by 2050, the reductions per car average 





II.  PROTECTING ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS 
THROUGH TIME-OF-USE RATES 
Along with the environmental benefits of market penetration 
comes the challenge of effectively managing GEV electricity use 
to ensure that those environmental benefits are realized and that 
electricity price spikes are avoided.  Ironically, these complex 
threats of price spikes and unrealized environmental benefits 
 
 17. Id. at 5-2. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. (Figure 5-1). 
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stem from a simple question that GEV owners will have to 
answer every day: what is the best time to recharge the car? 
GEV owners will likely want to plug in as soon as they are 
near a suitable outlet in order to keep their cars charged for 
future use.20  For many GEV owners this will mean plugging in 
their cars when they return home from work and pull into their 
garages.  Unfortunately, this occurs during the evening peak in 
electricity demand,21 which usually falls between the hours of 
4:00 P.M. and 7:00 P.M.22  During these hours (along with the 
morning peak hours),23 electricity demand is at its highest.  As 
the blue line in Chart 2 shows, GEVs charging in the evening 








 20. See POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES, supra 
note 13, at 9. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Frequently Asked Questions- Electricity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/ask/electricity_faqs.asp#peak_demand (last visited Dec. 
23, 2010) (providing access to daily load/demand profiles for various 
Independent System Operators). 
 23. Typically from 7:00 A.M. until 9:00 or 10:00 A.M.  See id. 
 24. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES, supra note 13, 
at 16. 
 25. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/4
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In a restructured state like New York, where generating 
facilities bid into the wholesale electricity market at their 
respective market-clearing prices, as demand for electricity 
increases, so does the wholesale price of electricity.26  As the 
wholesale price of electricity rises, more expensive generating 
facilities can profitably bid in at a market-clearing price.27  
Therefore, by adding to the peak demand for electricity, GEVs 
would drive up the peak electricity price, ultimately leading to 
higher rates for customers.  From an environmental perspective, 
the results are even less desirable, as the plants that come online 
only to meet peak demand tend to be the least efficient and 
dirtiest facilities on the grid (i.e. old oil generators).28
 The question then becomes: how do utilities and regulators, 
who represent the links between GEV owners and the wholesale 
generation market, smooth out the evening peak to mitigate these 
undesirable economic and environmental results?  The simple 
answer is: by designing electricity rates to encourage GEV owners 
to plug-in during off-peak hours when there is plenty of cheaper 
base-load capacity available. 
 
In June 2009, the New York Independent System Operator 
(NYISO), a not-for-profit corporation that manages New York’s 
electricity transmission grid and oversees the state’s wholesale 
electricity market, conducted a study on the potential impacts of 
GEVs on the grid, and recognized the importance of reducing the 
predicted spike in peak demand.29
 
 26. See James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller, A Primer on Electricity and the 
Economics of Deregulation, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND 
CHALLENGES 1, 12-14 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005).  See also 
Paul L. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in 
the United States, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 31, 
38-39 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005) (illustrating the 
components of a competitive electricity market). 
  As peak demand for electricity 
tends to be as much as fifty percent greater than off-peak 
demand, the grid has “a significant amount of excess generation 
 27. See Griffin & Puller, supra note 26, at 12-13. 
 28. See POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES, supra 
note 13, at 19-25.  See also Griffin & Puller, supra note 26, at 13 (demonstrating 
the electricity supply profile at various levels of marginal cost). 
 29. N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, ALTERNATE ROUTE: ELECTRIFYING THE 
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR: POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC 
VEHICLES ON NEW YORK STATE’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM 11 (2009). 
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capacity compared to demand” during off-peak hours.30
If given the choice between paying to charge their GEVs 
during peak pricing hours or off-peak pricing hours, car owners 
would have a strong incentive to charge off- peak.
  In other 
words, off-peak electricity is substantially cheaper than peak 
electricity as there is far less demand for it. 
31  But, 
residential customers typically do not face that choice.  Currently, 
almost all residential customers pay a flat rate all day and night, 
and thereby have no incentive to reduce usage during peak hours.  
The type of rate schedule that allows for a more sophisticated, 
informed choice is called “Time-of-Use,”32 and by opting in to this 
rate schedule, utility customers pay one of two electricity prices 
depending on the time of day.33  In most cases, the peak and off-
peak prices differ widely (with peak prices being much higher 
than off-peak prices),34 heavily incentivizing the customer to shift 
use away from the peak hours and on to the off-peak times.  
While each utility defines its off-peak price and hours differently, 
generally off-peak hours are from 10:00 P.M. until 7:00 A.M., and 
sometimes again in the midday hours for residential customers.35  
Weekends are almost always considered off-peak.36
Although all major utilities offer voluntary time-of-use rate 
schedules, the vast majority of residential customers do not opt 
in.  For example, according to Con Edison, a New York utility 




 30. Id. at 9. 
 “[a]s of 
 31. Con Edison’s summertime peak rate is 26.19 c/kWh, while its off peak 
rate is 1.01 c/kWh.  See CONSOL. EDISON, INC., SERVICE CLASSIFICATION NO. 1: 
RESIDENTIAL AND RELIGIOUS 3 (2008), available at http://www.coned.com/ 
documents/elec/201-210.pdf [hereinafter SERVICE CLASSIFICATION NO. 1]. 
 32. Guy R. Newsham & Brent G. Bowker, The Effect of Utility Time-Varying 
Pricing and Load Control Strategies on Residential Summer Peak Electricity 
Use: A Review, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 3289, 3290 (2010). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Severin Borenstein, Time-Varying Retail Electricity Prices: Theory 
and Practice, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 317, 327 
(James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Investor Information, Corporate Profile, CONSOL. EDISON. INC., 
http://investor.conedison.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61493&p=irol-homeprofile (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/4
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June 30, 2009, there were 2,337 customers taking service under 
the SC 1 voluntary time-of-day rate program.”38
For instance, while residential customers could shift 
activities such as using laundry machines or dishwashers to off-
peak hours, appliances like refrigerators stay on regardless of the 
time of day.  Similarly, many activities like using a blow dryer in 
the morning or turning on the lights after getting home from 
work can only take place during peak hours.  Moreover, even if a 
residential customer decided that he could shift much of his 
electricity use to off-peak hours, the calculation to determine 
whether switching to time-of-use rates would be cheaper than 
staying on a fixed rate would be a complicated endeavor.  A 
customer would have little certainty as to whether switching to 
time-of-use rates would actually prove to be cheaper. 
  Disregarding 
the lack of public awareness that time-of-use rates are even an 
option, this underutilization makes intuitive sense because most 
customers require electricity at peak times and their demand is 
relatively inelastic. 
But, there has rarely been a situation that so clearly calls for 
the adoption of time-of-use rates as the impending growth in GEV 
ownership.  The amount of electricity required to charge a GEV, 
coupled with how easy it would be to charge one during off-peak 
hours, would make GEV owners ideal candidates for time-of-use 
rates.  Incentivizing GEV charging away from the peak would not 
only alleviate some of the environmental problems associated 
with the dirtier generating units that are only economical during 
peak hours, but it would also increase demand for cheap 
generation that runs during off-peak hours.39
In New York, much of this cheap, off-peak generation comes 
from wind, a clean, renewable source of energy that produces 
most of its electricity during off-peak hours, as wind tends to blow 




 38. Response to Interrogatories, Case No. 09-E-0428 (July 28, 2009) (on file 
with author). 
  Not only would charging GEVs off-
peak help reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the increased 
demand (and concurrent increased price) for wind energy would 
 39. See Griffin & Puller, supra note 26, at 13 (demonstrating the electricity 
supply profile at various levels of marginal cost). 
 40. See N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, supra note 29, at 8. 
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also make it more economically viable as an investment for 
developers.  This ideal situation of wind-GEV synergy in New 
York, illustrated by Chart 3, can only work if GEV owners do 




III.  CREATING A RATE CLASS AND THE 
REGULATORY COMPACT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
How, then, can regulators ensure that utilities charge GEV 
owners on a time-of-use rate schedule rather than the traditional 
flat-rate residential schedule?  The simple answer is by grouping 
GEV owners into a new rate class, or group of customers charged 
on the same basis.  To fully display the legal and political 
implications of creating a rate class, this section will discuss 
ratemaking generally and, then, more specifically, it will explore 
the powers of a regulatory body to create a new rate class.  Again, 
the focus will be on New York as an example, although most of 
the legal and political issues will arise in any state with a 
significant market penetration of GEVs. 
Electric utilities are regional monopolies that distribute 
electricity to consumers from either a wholesale market or their 
own generating units.  In exchange for this state-granted 
 
 41. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/4
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monopoly power, utilities accept regulation by the state.42  
Utilities are further characterized by their service to the public 
interest, their duty to serve all members of the public in their 
respective territories, and their burden to charge reasonable 
rates.43  This regulatory compact is fundamental to 
understanding the underpinnings of rate regulation, as it forms 
the basis for the regulatory relationship between the public and a 
utility.  To manage this regulatory relationship, each state has 
created an agency charged with regulating utilities, and, in New 
York, the Public Service Commission serves this function.44
The bulk of a utility regulatory agency’s job is to resolve the 
central issue of “how much total revenue the utility should be 
permitted to collect through the rates charged for its services.”
 
45  
This total revenue figure is generally called a revenue 
requirement.  The components of a revenue requirement are: the 
amount of money that an agency allows a utility to earn on its 
assets based on a risk level necessary to attract investors, plus 
the utility’s operating expenses.46  The asset component of this 
rate calculation is also called a rate base, and usually consists of 
fixed investments that a utility has made on behalf of its 
customers (e.g., poles, wires, transformers, substations, 
electricity-generating units, and service trucks).47  Once the 
agency has held a rate proceeding and determined the total 
revenue requirement it then designs electricity rates for each 
customer class in order to generate the required revenue.48
 
 42. For a classic discussion of the nature of public utilities in the United 
States, see generally Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the 
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837); Munn v. Ill., 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Smyth v. 
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). 
 
 43. See generally Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. 420; Munn, 94 U.S. 113; 
Smyth, 196 U.S. 466. 
 44. About the Department of Public Service, N.Y. STATE PUB. SERV. COMM’N, 
http://www.dps.state.ny.us/New_aboutdps.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
 45. Richard D. Cudahy & J. Robert Malko, Electric Peak Load Pricing: 
Madison Gas and Beyond, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 47, 48-9 (citing PAUL J. GARFIELD & 
WALLACE F. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 44-50 (1964)). 
 46. See id. at 49. 
 47. See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 159-
63 (1961). 
 48. See id. at 52. 
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At their most basic, customer/rate classes, or groups of users 
who pay the same electricity rates as fellow class members, are 
broken down into residential, commercial, and industrial units.49  
There are a host of factors that a regulatory agency may consider 
when designing rate classes, the most important of which tend to 
be consumer demand characteristics and usage type.50  
Geographic concerns come into consideration as well.51  To avoid 
charging customers for assets and services that they do not use, 
and to make cost allocation easier, agencies ideally try to define 
rate classes so that customers with similar demand profiles and 
usage types (e.g., GEV owners) are grouped together.52
IV.  ACHIEVING REGULATORY GOALS THROUGH 
TIME-OF-USE RATES 
  Once an 
agency defines a rate class, it is then able to design rates to 
charge the customers in that class. 
A regulatory agency designs rate structures, as well as rate 
classes, to further the general goals of rate regulation.  As 
enumerated by Congress in the Federal Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), rate regulation should seek to 
conserve energy, optimize the efficiency of facilities and 
resources, and provide consumers with equitable rates.53  The 
Supreme Court has deferentially echoed these goals, hinging its 
constitutionally-informed, rate-related decisions on whether 
given rates are just and reasonable.54
In his oft-cited book, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES, 
economist James C. Bonbright developed eight criteria for 
 
 
 49. See, e.g., Service Classifications, Statements, Addenda, CONSOL. EDISON, 
INC., http://www.coned.com/rates/elec-sched3.asp (last visited Dec. 23, 2010). 
 50. See JONATHAN A. LESSER & LEONARDO R. GIACCHINO, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
ENERGY REGULATION 144 (2007). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 47, at 291-305 (discussing regulatory 
objectives of rate structure). 
 53. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611 
(2006). 
 54. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989); Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/4
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creating and evaluating a sound rate structure.55
 1. The related “practical” attributes of simplicity, 
understandability, public acceptability, and feasibility of 
application. 
  These criteria 
are: 
 2.  Freedom from controversies as to proper interpretation. 
 3. Effectiveness in yielding total revenue requirements under 
the fair-return standard. 
 4. Revenue stability from year to year. 
 5. Stability of the rates themselves, with a minimum of 
unexpected changes seriously adverse to existing customers. 
 6. Fairness of the specific rates in the apportionment of total 
cost of service among the different consumers. 
 7. Avoidance of “undue discrimination” in rate relationships. 
 8. Efficiency of rate classes and rate blocks in discouraging 
wasteful use of service while promoting all justified types and 
amounts of use.56
 According to Bonbright, the three most important criteria 
to a sound rate structure are the third, sixth, and eighth.
 
57  By 
ensuring a proper return on a utility’s asset base, successfully 
fulfilling the third criterion provides for the economic viability of 
the regulated corporation, clearly an important component of 
ratemaking.58  The sixth criterion, referring to a regulator’s 
ability to fairly spread the total revenue requirement across rate 
classes, highlights the basic principle behind rate class structure: 
a customer should not have to pay for the utility investments that 
he does not use.  For example, industrial customers tend to have 
different needs than residential customers, requiring different 
infrastructure investments from a utility, such as a new 
substation in an industrial area to handle high loads from which 
a residential customer might draw no benefit.  Different rate 
schedules should, and do, reflect this divergence in needs.  The 
eighth criterion, echoed by Congress in PURPA,59
 
 55. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 47, at 291; Cudahy & Malko, supra note 45, at 
49. 
 stresses the 
 56. Cudahy & Malko, supra note 45, at 49. 
 57. See id. at 50. 
 58. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 47, at 291. 
 59. See 16 U.S.C. § 2601. 
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significance of resource efficiency in utility regulation while 
taking into account both environmental concerns about pollution 
and economic concerns about resource scarcity. 
It is important to judge the soundness of time-of-use rates as 
an option with these criteria in mind, as “they remain the best 
available guide to evaluating a particular rate design.”60  In their 
1976 article Electric Peak Load Pricing: Madison Gas and 
Beyond, Richard D. Cudahy61 & J. Robert Malko applied these 
criteria, and found a host of benefits from implementing time-of-
use rates.62  For instance, by implementing time-of-use rates, 
which are much closer to the utilities’ actual costs of providing 
service, regulators can decrease peak demand, conserve limited 
energy resources, and provide an incentive to develop 
technologies such as more efficient home appliances.63
Overall, time-of-use rates enable “the individual customer to 
contribute to the efficiency of the system and thereby achieve 
favorable rate treatment.”
 
64  Time-of-use rates are so effective at 
meeting the broad goals of rate regulation that Congress sought 
to promote their widespread implementation when it passed 
PURPA.65
The rates charged by any electric utility for providing electric 
service to each class of electric consumers shall be on a time-of-
day
  PURPA’s Section 2621(d)(3) reflects the high hopes 
that Congress had for time-of-use rates: 
66 basis which reflects the costs of providing electric service to 
such class of electric consumers at different times of the day 
unless such rates are not cost-effective with respect to such class, 
as determined under section 2625(b) of this title.67
 
 60. Cudahy & Malko, supra note 45, at 50. 
 
 61. Richard D. Cudahy, Senior Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
7th Circuit, wrote this article while chairman of the Wisconsin Public Service 
Commission. 
 62. See Cudahy & Malko, supra note 45, at 57-58, 68-72. 
 63. See id. at 58 (citing Charles J. Cicchetti, The Design of Electricity Tariffs, 
96 PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY (1975)). 
 64. Id. at 69. 
 65. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(d)(3), 2625(b). 
 66. “Time-of-day” rates and “time-of-use” rates are synonymous. 
 67. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(3). 
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Pursuant to section 2625(b), time-of-use rates are cost-
effective “if the long-run benefits of such rate to the electric utility 
and its electric consumers in the class concerned are likely to 
exceed the metering and communications costs and other costs 
associated with the use of such rates.”68
Utilities can recover their investment in smarter meters, 
which are capable of measuring a customer’s usage based on the 
time of day, through a slightly higher customer charge on a time-
of-use customer’s monthly bill.
 
69  Depending on how much load 
they can shift off-peak, time-of-use customers should see monthly 
savings immediately.  Put simply, for customers that can shift 
their load, time-of-use rates are “cost-effective” under PURPA70 
and, as Cudahy & Malko describe, further the broader goals of 
utility regulation.71
V.  CREATING A GEV RATE CLASS IN NEW YORK 
STATE 
 
Given all the benefits of time-of-use rates, one might wonder 
why they have not been more widely implemented among 
residential customers.  The answer is simple: not all residential 
customers can shift their energy use to off-peak hours so as to 
lower their electricity bills.  In fact, residential customers who are 
unable to shift enough energy use off-peak could end up paying a 
higher bill under a time-of-use rate schedule.  This is where the 
impending market penetration of GEVs presents a unique 
situation.  GEV owners will, for the most part, be residential 
customers who pay a flat electricity rate.  But, the electricity 
demand of a person who uses a GEV will no longer match the 
demand profile of most other residential customers.  GEV owners 
can, as already discussed, shift much of their electricity use to off-
peak hours.  In light of this fundamental schism in the demand 
profile of residential customers, utility regulatory bodies should 
 
 68. 16 U.S.C. § 2625(b). 
 69. For a comparison of residential customer charges and time-of-use 
customer charges, see generally SERVICE CLASSIFICATION NO. 1, supra note 31. 
 70. See 16 U.S.C. § 2625(b). 
 71. See Cudahy & Malko, supra note 45, at 68-72. 
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carve out a separate rate class for GEV owners and mandate that 
such a class be billed under a time-of-use rate schedule. 
Utility regulatory agencies, including the New York State 
Public Service Commission (PSC), have the power to create a new 
rate class.72
The commission shall have power to require each. . .electric 
corporation to establish classifications of service based upon the 
quantity used, the time when used, the purpose for which used, 
the duration of use and upon any other reasonable consideration, 
and to establish in connection therewith just and reasonable 
graduated rates and charges; and it shall have power, either 
upon complaint or upon its own motion, to require such changes 
in such classifications, rates and charges as it shall determine to 
be just and reasonable.
  According to the New York Public Service Law: 
73
By expressly delegating to the PSC the authority to create a 
rate class based on the time of day when electricity is used and/or 
based on the purpose of that use, the statute gives the PSC the 
power to create a new rate class for GEV owners and to set the 
rates for that class.  Even if the New York Public Service Law 
were not clear in its intent on the issue of rate class designation, 
the discretion afforded to the PSC (and utility regulators in 
general) in interpreting and applying such statutory guidance is 




 The Supreme Court has held, with respect to ratemaking, 
that “[t]he Constitution is not designed to arbitrate these 
economic niceties.”
 
75  In Federal Power Commission v. Natural 
Gas Pipeline Co., the Supreme Court found that once a hearing 
has been held and proper findings have been made, “the courts 
cannot intervene in the absence of a clear showing that the limits 
of due process have been overstepped.”76
 
 72. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. § 66(14) (2005). 
  The Court further held 
 73. Id. (emphasis added). 
 74. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (providing broad goals to be achieved by state 
regulatory bodies, but not mandating how, specifically, to regulate). 
 75. Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 314. 
 76. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942) 
(“The Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the service of any single 
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that “[i]f the Commission’s order, as applied to the facts before it 
and viewed in its entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our 
inquiry is at an end.”77
This high level of deference to agency decision-making in 
regulating the utility industry has been consistent at the New 
York State level as well.  In delineating the role of the court in 
reviewing PSC decision-making, the Appellate Division and the 
Court of Appeals of New York have found that: 
 
“The business of rate making has been confided by the legislature 
to a body of experts with powers of inquiry and modification 
adequate to the task.”  However, once rates have been 
established, it is for the courts to interpret the schedules, to 
determine whether the schedules are applied as the Public 
Service Commission established them, and to enforce those 
schedules.78
Therefore, once the PSC has gone through its decision-
making process, New York courts will only determine whether 
the PSC’s decision is being applied and enforced, and will not 
review the merits of the PSC’s decision.  Thus, given this highly 
deferential standard of review, the PSC would not exceed its 




formula or combination of formulas.  Agencies to whom this legislative power 
has been delegated are free, within the ambit of their statutory authority, to 
make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular 
circumstances.  Once a fair hearing has been given, proper findings made and 
other statutory requirements satisfied, the courts cannot intervene in the 
absence of a clear showing that the limits of due process have been overstepped.  
If the Commission's order, as applied to the facts before it and viewed in its 
entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our inquiry is at an end.”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Columbia Gas of N.Y., Inc. v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 289 N.Y.S.2d 
339, 344 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.  1968) (quoting Judge Cardozo in City of Rochester v. 
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 134 N.E. 828, 832 (N.Y. 1922)).  See N.Y. State 
Council of Retail Merchants v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 45 N.Y.2d 661, 669-670 (N.Y. 
1978) (“[W]e cannot say that the courts are entitled to substitute their judgment 
for the evaluation of the commission, giving fair consideration to the expertise 
possessed by the commission in weighing the impact of rate-fixing factors on 
both the utilities and the consuming public and reaching the ultimate 
determination as to how appropriately to proceed in this given instance.”). 
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VI.  STATUTORY IMPEDIMENTS TO A GEV RATE 
CLASS ON A TIME-OF-USE RATE SCHEDULE 
Even if the PSC were to create a new rate class for GEV 
owners, one roadblock to implementing a time-of-use rate 
schedule for those owners might still remain; the PSC’s 
interpretation that Section 66(27)(a) of New York’s Public Service 
Law79 does not grant it the authority to mandate time-of-use 
rates for a residential rate class.80
As New York State’s utility regulatory body, the PSC has 
only those powers conferred upon it by the legislature and those 
powers that are “incident thereto and or necessarily implied 
therefrom.”
  However, given the legislative 
history of Section 66(27) and the broad discretion afforded the 
Commission, were the PSC to prudently change its position and 
mandate time-of-use rates for GEV owners, it could do so both 
within its discretion and in conformity with legislative intent. 
81  Given this limitation, the PSC has been given both 
“a broad mandate to ensure that all New Yorkers have access to 
reliable and low-cost utility services,”82 and the power to carry 
out this mandate with broad discretion.83  As previously 
discussed, the impending adoption of GEVs will lead to higher 
rates and the possible need for “significant additional generation 
capacity,” unless time-of-use rates or a similar incentive to charge 
off-peak is implemented.84
In order to avoid such consequences, the PSC must encourage 
off-peak charging by requiring that all GEV owners be billed for 
their electricity consumption on a time-of-use rate schedule.  
Unfortunately, the explicit statutory authority allowing the PSC 
to mandate time-of-use rates “where it deems such rates to be in 
 
 
 79. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. § 66(27)(a). 
 80. See, e.g., In re Competitive Opportunities Regarding Elec. Serv., 2006 WL 
2346389 at *7, *n.15 (Aug. 1, 2006). 
 81. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 478 N.Y.S.2d 78, 82 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1984).  See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 388 
N.Y.S.2d 157 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 3 
N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938), aff’d, 18 N.E.2d 287 (N.Y. 1938). 
 82. About the Department of Public Service, N.Y. STATE PUB. SERV. COMM’N, 
http://www.dps.state.ny.us/New_aboutdps.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
 83. See generally Fed. Power Comm’n, 315 U.S. 575. 
 84. See N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, supra note 29, at 4. 
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the public interest” was removed from the New York Public 
Service Law in 1997.85
The section of the state Public Service Law pertinent to time-
of-use rates currently reads: 
 
Each electric corporation with annual gross revenues in excess of 
two hundred million dollars shall offer the option of paying 
charges on the basis of time-of-use rates for service to its 
residential customers. . .Such electric corporations shall 
periodically send a notice explaining the rates and informing 
such customers and organizations that the rates are available.86
Before the 1997 Amendment, section 66(27)(a)’s final 
sentence read, “Nothing in this section shall prohibit the 
commission from mandating such time-of-use rates where it 
deems such rates to be in the public interest.”
 
87
 Although there is no language in the Public Service Law 
that actively prohibits the PSC from mandating time-of-use rates 
for residential customers, the PSC has interpreted the 1997 
amendment to have that effect.
 
88  Given the circumstances 
surrounding the amendment and the legislative history, the PSC 
appears to be carrying out New York State legislative intent 
through its refusal to mandate time-of-use rates.89
However, as the legislative history also shows, widespread 
electric vehicle adoption was not within the minds of the 




 85. S. Bill 4467, 1997-1998 Sess. (N.Y. 1997). 
  Thus, the PSC could, and should, 
in light of the potential economic and environmental benefits to 
ratepayers, reinterpret Section 66(27) of the New York Public 
Service Law as not precluding the implementation of mandatory 
 86. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66(27)(a). 
 87. N.Y. S. Bill 4467. 
 88. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66(27)(a); In re Competitive Opportunities 
Regarding Elec. Serv., 2006 WL 2346389 at *7, *n.15 (stating that “The 
Commission is not authorized to mandate time-of-use rates for residential 
customers” and “Chapter 307 of the Laws of 1997 amended Public Service Law § 
66(27)(a) to delete a provision authorizing the Commission to mandate time-of-
use rates for residential customers, in the public interest.”). 
 89. See N.Y. S. Bill 4467. 
 90. See id. 
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time-of-use rates for residential GEV owners, who were clearly 
beyond the foresight of the New York Legislature in 1997. 
 According to its Senate Bill Jacket, the 1997 amendment of 
Section 66(27) of the New York Public Service Law constituted 
“an act to amend the public service law, in relation to prohibiting 
the public service commission from mandating the use of certain 
rates for customers of electric corporations.”91  The overwhelming 
concern of the legislature was that “many customers, especially 
large residential users and religious organizations are adversely 
affected by time-of-use rates since they are not able to shift 
energy usage to non-peak periods.”92
This change of policy followed an attempt by Con Edison to 
implement a broad mandatory time-of-use rate schedule 
promulgated by the PSC to promote energy conservation among 
high-usage residential customers.
  The concern is a valid one.  
Requiring users who could not shift their loads off-peak to take on 
time-of-use rates that would cost them more is undesirable. 
93  The negative consumer 
response from these efforts is what ultimately drove the 
legislature to amend the Public Service Law.94  The PSC and Con 
Edison had wrongly assumed that high-usage residential 
customers would adapt to the new rates, and the public backlash 
was strong.95  Accordingly, the PSC has held that a residential 
customer’s voluntary consent is particularly important in time-of-
use rate programs targeting submetered residential buildings; 
the concern being that tenants might unknowingly be put on 
time-of-use rates at their landlords’ behests.96
 
 91. Id. 
 
 92. Id. (Introducer’s Memorandum in Support). 
 93. See BARBARA ALEXANDER, SMART METERS, REAL TIME PRICING, AND 
DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR LOW INCOME ELECTRIC 
CUSTOMERS 5, 52 (2007), available at http://www.pulp.tc/Smart_Meters__ 
Real_Time.pdf (report prepared for U.S. Department of Energy). 
 94. See N.Y. S. Bill 4467 (Memorandum to Council to the Governor from 
General Counsel for Department of Public Service). 
 95. See ALEXANDER, supra note 93, at 5 (“New York previously had a 
mandatory time of use rate for very high usage residential electric customers.  
Despite the presumed ability of very high usage customers to adapt to time of 
use rates, the program was so unpopular the state legislature amended the law 
to make any residential time of use program voluntary.”). 
 96. Declaratory Ruling on the Submetering of Residential Customers at 
Time-of-use Rates, No. 04-E-1335, 2005 WL 1353616, at * 4 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. 
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 Thus, the overriding theme behind the legislature’s 1997 
amendment, and the PSC’s interpretation of it, has been a desire 
to protect the often under-informed and non-consenting consumer 
from paying higher electric bills because of an inability to shift 
usage off-peak after having been placed on a time-of-use rate 
schedule.  But, GEV owners, by their very nature, do not fall into 
this class of customers that the 1997 amendment aimed to 
protect. 
For one, GEV owners would be more informed than the 
average residential customer, let alone the uninformed 
submetered tenant.  Purchasing a GEV necessitates interaction 
with a utility.  A GEV owner will typically need to install a new 
high amp wall charger in his home for overnight charging.  The 
utility will be involved in this process.  Moreover, rather than 
being a passive consumer whose electricity bill might be changed 
by a utility under a mandatory time-of-use schedule, a GEV 
owner will have presumably thought about the electricity billing 
implications of plugging in his car, and would likely even be 
aware of the environmental benefits of plugging in during off-
peak hours. 
 The second concern with regard to imposing time-of-use 
rates on residential customers is that those customers will not be 
able to shift their energy use off-peak.  Similarly, this concern 
does not apply to GEV owners as it might to average residential 
customers.  GEV owners can inherently shift a large portion of 
their electricity use off-peak with minimal effort.  At the most 
burdensome, a GEV owner would plug in his car at 10:00 P.M. 
instead of at 6:00 P.M. when he came home from work.  More 
likely, though, the owner could install a timer on his charging 
outlet and set it for 10:00 P.M. when he arrives home.  Ideally – 
and in the not-too-distant future, realistically – the GEV will be 
integrated with smart grid technology and the owner could 
 
Comm’n June 8, 2005), available at http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/ 
WebFileRoom.nsf/0/81EAF848232FE1C7852570 
1900470935/$File/04e1335.06.08.05.pdf?OpenElement (“Submetering plans 
proposing to implement . . . TOU rates must provide a means for customers to 
actively choose whether or not they wish to take service under such rates.  
Submeterers also should hold informational meetings with residents to explain 
the proposed . . . TOU rates and to answer residents’ questions.”). 
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manage her usage on a real-time basis from a computer or smart-
phone. 
VII.  A PATH FOR THE PSC 
The impending adoption of GEV’s throughout New York 
State poses a new challenge to regulators – one that was not 
addressed by the legislature’s 1997 amendment “prohibiting the 
public service commission from mandating the use of certain 
rates for customers.”97
While currently available voluntary time-of-use rates may 
encourage some owners to switch rate schedules, historical data 
show that customers will not take advantage of such rates.
  The challenge is to effectively mitigate 
the potential price spikes and increased GHG emissions 
stemming from GEV-related peak demand increases. 
98
Seen from a macro perspective, a move by the PSC to put 
GEV owners on time-of-use rate schedules would send a message 
that New York State is serious about reaping the environmental 
and economic benefits of the coming boom in electric vehicle use.  
Creating a GEV-owner rate class that can easily shift its 
electricity demand to times when demand is low, and encouraging 
  
Therefore, to ensure that GEV owners – who, in their decision to 
drive a GEV have demonstrated, at minimum, an awareness of 
environmental and energy costs – actually help the environment 
and realize lower energy costs, the PSC should interpret the 1997 
amendment to Section 66(27) of the New York Public Service Law 
with particular attention to its twin underlying concerns: the 
desire to protect (1) uninformed ratepayers who (2) cannot shift 
load off-peak.  The PSC need not worry about either concern with 
respect to GEV owners and should view this novel class of 
ratepayers as beyond the intent and purview of the 1997 
amendment, enabling the Commission to require that owners of 
GEVs pay for their electricity on a time-of-use rate schedule. 
 
 97. N.Y. S. Bill 4467. 
 98. See SERVICE CLASSIFICATION NO. 1, supra note 31, at 3.  One reason that 
customers have failed to switch to time-of-use rates is because of a lack of 
accessible data to show that such a switch would be economically wise.  Utilities 
may be in the best position to single out which customers would benefit from 
voluntary time-of-use rates but few utilities have taken this step. 
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that rate class to make that shift, would not only decrease peak 
use and the concurrent need for dirty, inefficient generators, but 
also provide built-in demand for homegrown wind energy. 
Ultimately, the PSC is charged with protecting consumers 
from high electricity rates.  Creating a time-of-use rate schedule 
for a GEV owner rate class would protect residential customers 
from rate increases.  GEV owners have different needs and 
demand profiles from those of residential customers.  If kept in a 
residential rate class on a flat rate schedule, GEV owners would 
have no incentive to charge off-peak.  Peak demand would 
increase on an already-stressed electric grid, leading to the 
expanded use of older, less efficient, dirtier, more expensive 
generators, which, in turn, would lead to higher rates and more 
air pollution.  The PSC should not allow the near-term solution to 
the transportation fuel inflexibility problem to lead to rate 
increases and environmental degradation.  Creating a new rate 
class for GEV owners and charging that class on time-of-use rates 
would help avoid these problems, and ultimately help New York 
State become more energy independent and environmentally 
benevolent, while setting an example for other states to follow. 
 
23
